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Abstract—Email spoofing is a critical step in phishing attacks,
where the attacker impersonates someone that the victim knows
or trusts. In this paper, we conduct a qualitative study to explore
why email spoofing is still possible after years of efforts to
design, develop, and promote anti-spoofing protocols (SPF, DKIM,
DMARC). Previous research shows that the adoption rates of
anti-spoofing protocols are still very low. To understand the
reasons behind the slow adoption, we conduct a user study with
9 email administrators from different institutions. The results
show that email administrators are aware of the weaknesses of
these protocols and believe the current protocol adoption lacks
the crucial mass due to the protocol defects, weak incentives,
and practical deployment challenges. Based on these results, we
discuss the key implications to protocol designers, email providers
and users, and future research directions to mitigate the email
spoofing threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing attack is a known threat to the Internet. Recently,
this threat has been significantly escalated due to its heavy
involvement in massive data breaches [41], ransomware out-
breaks [27], and even political campaigns [11]. For example,
spear phishing emails have been used in nearly half of the 2000
reported breaches in 2016, responsible for leaking billions of
data records [41].
Email spoofing is a critical step in phishing attacks where
the attacker impersonates someone that the victim knows or
trusts. By spoofing the email address of a reputable organization
or a close friend, the attacker has a better chance to deceive
the victim [17]. To prevent spoofing, there has been an active
effort since the early 2000 to develop, promote, and deploy
anti-spoofing protocols. Protocols such as SPF [21], DKIM [6],
and DMARC [26] have become the Internet standards, allowing
email receivers to verify the sender’s identity.
Despite these efforts, however, sending spoofing emails is
still surprisingly easy today. As an example, Figure 1 shows a
spoofing email where the sender address is set to the domain
of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). We
crafted and sent this email to our own account in Yahoo (as the
victim), and it successfully reached the inbox without triggering
any warnings. This is not a coincident as email spoofing is still
widely used in real-world phishing attacks [41], [32], [11].
The real question is, why email spoofing is still possible after
years of efforts spent on the defense. In 2015, two measurement
studies [10], [14] show that the adoption rates of anti-spoofing
protocols are still low. Among Alexa top 1 million domains,
only 40% have adopted SPF and only 1% have DMARC.
In this paper, we perform a qualitative study to understand
why anti-spoofing protocols are not widely adopted, particularly
from email providers’ perspectives. To understand the percep-
tion of email providers, we conduct a user study with email
Fig. 1. A spoofing email that impersonates the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS). We acted as the attacker and sent this email
to our own account. The email arrived the inbox without triggering any alert
(Mr. Hu is a fictional name).
administrators from different institutions. This user study turned
out to be challenging to conduct. Part of the reason is that
the candidate pool is small. People who can provide insights
for our questions need to have extensive experience managing
real-world email services. In addition, email administrators
often hesitate (or are not allowed) to share details about their
anti-phishing/spoofing solutions. To these ends, we send our
user study requests to 4000 email administrators of Alexa
top domains. We eventually received responses from N = 9
administrators from various organizations (universities, payment
services, online community websites) who agree to answer open
questions either online or through in-person interviews.
Our results show that email administrators are aware of
the technical weaknesses of SPF, DKIM and DMARC. The
general perception is that these protocols are “helpful”, but
“cannot solve the spoofing problem completely”. The email
administrators believe that the slow adoption of the protocols is
primarily due to the lack of a critical mass. Like many network
protocols, the benefits of the anti-spoofing protocols come into
existence only if a large number of Internet domains start
to adopt the protocols to publish their authentication records.
Currently, the incentive of adoption is not strong, especially
for Internet domains that don’t host emails services (but they
still can be spoofed). In addition to the technical weaknesses,
the email administrators pointed out the practical challenges
to deploy the protocols, particularly, for organizations that
use cloud-based email services and large organizations that
have many dependent services. Finally, email administrators
share their thoughts on the possible solutions moving forward.
One interesting direction is to improve the current email user
interface to support security indicators, and educate users to
proactively check email authentication results.
In summary, our work makes three contributions.
• First, through the user study, we provide new insights
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into the perceived values and concerns of anti-spoofing
protocols from email providers’ perspectives. These
results shed light to the reasons behind the slow
adoption of SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, pointing out
the directions of improvement moving forward.
• Second, we discuss the key implication of the results
to protocol designers, email providers, and users. We
discuss the possible solutions at the user-end to make
up for the defective server-side authentication.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In the following, we describe the background of email
spoofing attacks and anti-spoofing protocols. Then, we introduce
related technology adoption theories to set up the contexts for
our study.
A. SMTP and Email Spoofing
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is the Internet
standard for email transmission [33]. A key limitation of SMTP
is that it has no built-in security features to prevent people
(attackers) from impersonating/spoofing an arbitrary sender
address. To perform a spoofing attack, attackers can manipulate
two key fields to send emails. First, after establishing an SMTP
connection to the target mail server, the attacker can use the
“MAIL FROM” command and set the sender address to anyone
that they want to impersonate. After that, the “MAIL FROM”
address is inserted into the header as the “Return-Path”. In
addition, attackers can modify another field called “From” in
the email header. This “From” field specifies the address that
will be displayed on the email interface [36]. When a user
receives the email, the user will see the “From” address (e.g.,
visa@uscis.gov in Figure 1). If the user replies the email, the
reply message will go to the “Return-Path” set by “MAIL FROM”.
Note that the two addresses are not necessarily the same.
Email spoofing is a critical step of phishing attacks to gain
the victim’s trust [35], [16], [17]. Meanwhile, spoofing is also
a strong signal of phishing attacks [16], [22], [23], [28], [34].
Spoofing detection results are often used by phishing detection
systems [7], [9], [13], [15], [37].
B. Anti-Spoofing Protocols
To detect and prevent email spoofing, SMTP extension
protocols are proposed including SPF, DKIM and DMARC.
All three protocols have been published or standardized by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
SPF. Sender Policy Framework (SPF) was proposed in early
2000, and standardized in 2014 [21]. SPF allows a domain
to publish a list of IPs that are authorized to send emails on
its behalf. For instance, the domain a.com can publish its
SPF record in the DNS. When the receiving server receives
the MAIL FROM command claiming to be alex@a.com, the
receiving server can check if the sender IP is listed in the SPF
record of a.com.
DKIM. DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) was first
drafted in 2004 and standardized in 2011 [6]. DKIM uses a
public-key based approach to authenticate the email sender and
check the email integrity. More specifically, the sender’s email
service will place a digital signature in the email header signed
by the private key associated with the sender’s domain. The
receiving service can retrieve the sender’s public key from DNS
to verify the signature. To retrieve a DKIM public key from
DNS, one will need the selector information (an attribute in
the DKIM signature beside the domain name. By verifying the
DKIM signature, the receiver can detect if the signed message
has been modified, to ensure integrity and authenticity.
DMARC. Domain-based Message Authentication, Report-
ing and Conformance (DMARC) was drafted in 2011 and
published in 2015 [26]. DMARC is not a standalone protocol
but needs to work with SPF and/or DKIM. DMARC allows the
domain owner to publish a “failing policy” which specifies what
actions the receiver should take when the incoming email fails
the DMARC checks. In addition, DMARC requires identifier
alignment from SPF or DKIM. For SPF, alignment means that
MAIL FROM address used for the SPF check should be consistent
with the From field in the header. For DKIM, alignment means
that the domain name in the DKIM signature should match the
From field. Alignment ensures the email address that user sees
matches with the authenticated address.
C. Technology Adoption Theories
To provide the contexts for our study, we briefly introduce
the important theories of technology adoptions [31], [25], [19],
[20]. With a focus on the networking and security protocols,
prior works have examined the adoption of DNSSEC [4],
IPv6 [5], HTTPS [12], Bitcoin [3], and Biometric tracking [2].
Below, we discuss three adoption theories related to our study.
TAM. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is the most
basic theory that models user intention to adopt new tech-
nologies [40], [39]. The model describes the key factors that
influence user decision, the most important of which are
perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease-of-use (PEOU).
In our context, “users” refer to email services. TAM has many
extended versions with more factors added to the model (e.g.,
self-efficacy, quality of the system) [24], [40], [8], [29].
Network Externalities. For network protocols, the standard
TAM is usually not sufficient to explain their adoption since
individual user’s decision is likely to affect other users. This
leads to the notion of Network Externalities (or net effect) [19],
[3]. Network externalities mean that an individual adopter can
add the value for other people to adopt the same technology.
In other words, when more users adopt the same protocol,
the value of the protocol to each user will also increase [38].
For anti-spoofing protocols, if more domains publish their
SPF/DKIM/DMARC records, it makes easier for other email
providers to detect spoofing emails.
Cost-Benefit Model. Ozment and Schechter propose an
adoption model that focuses on the cost-benefit perspective [30].
The model argues that only when the benefits to individual
adopters overweight the adoption costs will the protocol be
widely accepted. For network protocols, the per-user benefits
may grow as more users adopt the protocol (net effect) [1]. The
costs can be either constant or changing (mostly decreasing)
as more users adopt the protocol.
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TABLE I. USER STUDY PARTICIPANTS: 9 EMAIL ADMINISTRATORS. U8 REQUESTED TO CONCEAL THE INSTITUTION TYPE, AND THUS WE KEEP IT AS
“ANONYMOUS”. FOR EACH OF THEIR EMAIL SERVICES, WE ALSO MEASURED WHETHER THE EMAIL DOMAIN PUBLISHED THE DNS AUTHENTICATION
RECORDS (AS THE SENDER) AND WHETHER THE DOMAIN AUTHENTICATE INCOMING EMAILS (AS THE RECEIVER).
UserID User Study Method Email Service Type As Sender: Publish Records? As Receiver: Authenticate?SPF DKIM DMARC SPF DKIM DMARC
U1 In-person Interview University1 (campus-level) 3 / 3 3 3 3
U2 In-person Interview University1 (department-level) 5 / 5 3 3 3
U3 Open-question Survey Payment System 3 / 3 3 3 3
U4 Open-question Survey Website Hosting Service 3 / 5 5 3 5
U5 Open-question Survey Advertisement Service1 3 / 3 3 3 3
U6 Open-question Survey Advertisement Service2 3 / 5 3 3 3
U7 Open-question Survey University2 (campus-level) 5 / 5 3 3 3
U8 Open-question Survey Anonymous / / / / / /
U9 Open-question Survey Online Community 3 / 5 3 3 3
Often cases, a network protocol requires a minimal level of
deployment before creating enough benefits to overweight the
costs. This leading to notions of critical mass which represents
the minimal number of adopters in order to facilitate self-
sustaining adoption or create further growth [38].
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we conduct an exploratory study to understand
the adoption of anti-spoofing protocols. We qualitatively look
into two key questions. First, what are the reasons behind the
relatively low rate of anti-spoofing protocols? Second, why did
most domain owners configure the protocol with relaxed failing
policies?
To answer these questions, we seek to understand the
user perception of these protocols in terms of the perceived
usefulness (PU) and perceived ease-of-use (PEOU) (two key
aspects of TAM). Here, “users” does not refer to the users of
the email system. Instead, “users” refer to the email service
administrators who will use the protocol to defend against
spoofing attacks.
To understand email providers’ perceptions towards the anti-
spoofing protocols, we conduct a user study (with IRB approval).
The biggest challenge for this user study is to recruit participants
to share their experience and insights. More specifically, we
need to recruit participants who have real-world experience
of operating an email service and/or deploying anti-spoofing
protocols. This narrows down the candidate pool to a small
and highly specialized user population. In addition, real-world
email administrators are often reluctant to share due to the
sensitivity of the topic. For many companies and organizations,
details about their phishing/spoofing detection systems are non-
disclosable.
To address these challenges, we sent our user study requests
to a large number of email administrators. More specifically, we
contacted the email administrators of Alexa top 4000 domains.
In the user study request, we ask about their preferred ways of
participation (e.g., survey, phone interviews) and the level of
details they feel comfortable to share. In total, we recruit N = 9
email providers from different organizations. 7 participants
agree to fill in a survey with “open questions” and 2 participants
agree to do an in-person interview. In Table I, we list the
9 email administrators and the type of their institutions and
organizations. Note that U8 requested to conceal the institution-
specific information, and thus we keep it as “anonymous”.
This small-scale but in-depth user study seeks to provide
useful qualitative results and new insights from protocol users’
perspectives.
To provide the context for each email service that the
participant manages, we also performed a quick measurement
as shown in Table I. We measured whether the email domain
published the corresponding authentication records in DNS (as
the sender) and whether the domain performed authentication
checks on the incoming emails (as the receiver). Same as before,
we cannot measure whether an email domain has published
the DKIM public key without knowing its selector (marked
with “/”). We observe that most of the email services perform
all three authentication checks on incoming emails (7 out of
8) and one email service checks DKIM only. However, when
acting as the sender domain, only 3 email services published
both SPF and DMARC records to the DNS.
For the interview and survey participants, we use the same
list of open questions. The difference is that we can ask follow-
up questions to the interview participants, but not the survey
participants. Some of the detailed questions are designed based
on the results of step1, which we will discuss later. At the high-
level, the open questions fall into the following themes. First, we
ask the participants to comment on the email spoofing problem
and how they usually detect spoofing attempts. Second, we
ask the participants to comment on the value that SPF, DKIM
and DMARC could bring in for their email services. Third,
we ask about their personal perceptions towards the under-
adoption of anti-spoofing protocols and the possible reasons.
Fourth, we ask why most of the deployed protocols were
not configured “strictly”. Finally, we ask the participants to
comment on the possible solutions moving forward to the email
spoofing problem.
The survey participants answer the open questions using an
online survey website that we set up. The interview participants
then have a face-to-face interview session for 45 to 60 minutes.
Our study is approved by IRB. We ensure that all the data are
properly anonymized and securely stored.
IV. RESULT: USER STUDY
Our user study focuses on open questions regarding the
values and concerns of SPF, DKIM and DMARC, and the
possible reasons behind their slow adoption. In the following,
we discuss our findings by grouping the results into 6 high-level
topics.
A. Technical Defects of the Protocols
Email administrators have acknowledged the values of
adoption these protocols. However, the most discussed topics
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are still the technical flaws in SPF, DKIM and DMARC. We
summarize these tehnical flaws as the following.
First, SPF and DKIM both have the problem of “identifier
alignment”. It means that the sender email address that user
sees can be different from the address that is actually used to
do perform authentication. For SPF, the authentication focuses
on the “Return-Path” and examines whether the sender’s IP is
listed in the “Return-Path” domain’s SPF record. An attacker
can set the “Return-Path” domain to her own domain and set
her SPF record to pass the authentication. However, what the
receiving user sees on the email interface is set by the “From”
field. DKIM has a similar problem given that the domain to
sign the email with the DKIM key can be different from the
domain on the “Return-Path” . DMARC helps to revolve the
prolem by enforing the alignment of the identifiers.
Second, mail forwarding is a problem for SPF. Mail
forwarding means one email service automatically forwards
emails to another email service. A common scenario is that
university students often configure their university email service
to forward all their emails to Outlook or Gmail. During Mail
forwarding, the email metadata (e.g., “Return-Path”) remains
unchanged. SPF will fail after mail forwarding because the
forwarder’s IP will not match the original sender’s SPF record.
Thrid, mailing list is a major problem for both SPF and
DKIM. When a message is sent to a mailing list, the mailing
list will “broadcast” the message to all the subscribers. This is
a similar process as mail forwarding. During this process, the
mailing list’s IP will become the sender IP, which is different
from the original sender’s IP. This will leads to SPF failure.
Mailing lists will cause trouble for DKIM because most mailing
lists modify the email content before broadcasting it to the
subscribers. The common modification is to add a “footer”
with the mailing list’s name and a link for un-subscription.
Tempering the email content will cause DKIM failure. DMARC
helps to solve some of the problems, but not the mailing list
problem. For mailing lists, DMARC+SPF will be sure to fail —
if the “Return-Path” is modified, DMARC will fail due to the
misalignment of identifiers; if the “Return-Path” is unmodified,
SPF will fail due to the IP mismatch. For DMARC+DKIM, it
will fail if the mailing list still has to modify the email content.
In particular, U7pointed out the problem of DKIM beyond
just the mailing list problem. U7 stated that DKIM was too
sensitive to “benign” changes to the email content such as line
rewrapping and URL expansion. These operations that are very
common in email services (sometimes for usability purposes),
but can easily lead to invalid signatures. The sensitivity of
DKIM also discourages email administrators to deploy DMARC
(which need to work with DKIM).
“U7: DKIM is inherently flawed because semantically
meaningless changes to a message can render the
signature invalid. For example, the relaxed body
canonicalization algorithm is sensitive to line rewrap-
ping, which will invalidate the signature without
changing the semantic content of the message. Flaws
like this make DKIM signatures fragile, reducing the
utility of DKIM and thus lessening the priority of its
deployment.”
“U7: The fragility of DKIM also affects the utility
of DMARC, and thus reducing the priority of its
deployment as well.”
B. A Lack of Critical Mass
Email administrators mentioned that there had not been a
global consensus that SPF, DKIM or DMARC should be the
ultimate solution to stop spoofing. Part of the reason is these
protocols are struggling to support common email scenarios
such as mail forwarding. Due to the technique weaknesses,
the general perception is that SFP, DKIM and DMARC are
“helpful” but “cannot solve the spoofing problem completely”.
U2 mentioned that potential adopters could be are waiting to
see whether enough people would eventually get on board.
“U2: It is not the final answer that the industry picked
up yet. I felt at this point that enough people haven’t
really adopted it, it’s not worth for me to set it up.”
In addition, U1 and U2 both mentioned that in general
there was no penalty to domains for not publishing an
SPF/DKIM/DMARC record. Their emails are typically not
discriminated unless other malicious signals are detected. This
reflects a typical bootstrapping challenge, where a “critical
mass” is needed in order to facilitate a self-sustaining adoption
process [30].
C. Benefits Not Significantly Overweight Costs
Email administrators then discussed the deeper reasons for
the lack of critical mass. U1 pointed out that the protocol
adopter does not directly benefit from publishing their SPF,
DKIM or DMARC records in the DNS. Instead, these DNS
records mainly help other email services to verify incoming
emails and protect the customers (users) of other email services.
Domains that publish the DNS records receive the benefit of a
better reputation, which is a relatively vague benefit, particularly
for domains that don’t host email services.
“U1: If I am an email provider, I am not motivated
to set up SPF, I am motivated to make sure people
who have sent (emails) to my customers have set SPF.
I am motivated to evaluate it.”
For popular online services (e.g., social networks, banks),
however, they are likely to be motivated to publish SPF, DKIM,
and DMARC records to prevent being spoofed and maintain
their good reputation (U2, U3).
To help to illustrate this challenge, we plot Figure 2, which
is a modified version of the Ozment-Schechter model [30].
Ozment-Schechter model depicts the general challenge for net-
work protocols to receive a wide adoption, and we customized
the model for email spoofing scenarios and created a separate
plot for non-email domains (Figure 2(b)).
For email domains (Figure 2(a)), when more domains
publish their SPF, DKIM or DMARC records, the benefits
for each adopter will increase because more incoming emails
can be authenticated. Regarding the costs, there will be a
constant base cost for deploying the protocol. On top of that,
early adopters also need to handle the insecure domains that
have not adopted the protocol and those with misconfigurations.
The cost of insecure domains will drop as more domains adopt
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Fig. 2. The adoption model for anti-spoofing protocols. For email domains,
the cost and benefit changes as more domains adopt the protocol. For non-email
domains, the cost and benefit stay constant.
the protocol. However, this cost cannot reach zero due to the
technical issues in these protocols as discussed before.
Figure 2(b) shows a bigger challenge to motivate non-
email domains to publish the SPF/DMARC record. For non-
email domains (e.g., office.com), the benefit of publishing the
SPF/DMARC record is to prevent attackers from impersonating
the non-email domain and helps the non-email domain to
maintain a good reputation. The domain administrators publish
the SPF/DMARC records to be a good Internet “citizen” and
help other email services to detect spoofing emails. However,
these benefits are considered indirect and thus relatively weaker
(U5, U6). Overall, the cost and benefit model is not in favor of
creating a “critical mass” for a wide adoption. The bootstrapping
phase is challenging without external enforcement or incentives.
D. Deployment Difficulties in Practice
Even if an email administrator decided to deploy the
protocol, there would be other challenges in the way. We
summarize the participants’ responses from three aspects: (1) a
lack of control on the DNS or even the mail servers, (2) the large
number of dependency services, (3) a lack of understanding of
the protocol and the deployment difficulties.
First, certain services do not have a control over their
DNS record. Publishing SPF/DKIM/DMARC record will incur
additional overhead to coordinate with their DNS providers (U1,
U4, U9). In addition, many companies and organizations even
don’t maintain their own mail servers but rely on cloud-based
email services. Using cloud-based email services is convenient
without the need the handle challenging tasks such as spam
filtering. The drawback is that the organization need to rely on
the cloud email service to deploy the anti-spoofing protocols.
“U1: So we have very limited control over our DNS.
Right now, it is just the difficulty of setting up that
DNS.”
Another challenge is that the strict enforcement of certain
email protocols requires significant efforts for coordination in
big institutions. An email system has many dependent services
(e.g., marketing tools) distributed in different departments in
a big institution. Deploying a new email protocol requires a
non-trivial collaboration effort from different departments.
“U7: Strict enforcement requires identifying all the
legitimate sources of email using a return address do-
main. Large, decentralized organizations (e.g. many
large universities), will often have organizational
units which acquire third-party services involving
email, like email marketing tools, without telling
central IT. Figuring all this out and putting policies
and procedures in place to prevent it is more work
than many admins have time for.”
Finally, the participants mentioned that there had been
a lack of deep understanding of the anti-spoofing protocols,
especially the new protocols such as DMARC. It is difficult
to estimate how much effort is needed to deploy and maintain
the protocol in practice. U3 particularly mentioned that there
is a general perception that deploying anti-spoofing protocols
is difficult. Regardless the actual level of the difficulty, the
perceived difficulty makes email administrators hesitated to try
(U3, U9).
“U3: Many people believe that DKIM is hard, and
thus don’t prioritize deploying it ... Many people
don’t understand DMARC, how easy it is to deploy,
and how effective it is.”
E. Risks of Breaking the Existing System
Participants have discussed the concerns of breaking the
existing email system due to unfamiliarity to the protocol. This
is particularly true for DMARC (published in 2015). Email
providers need to go through careful testing to make sure the
protocol does not block legitimate incoming emails, and their
own emails are not blocked by others.
“U2: Probably because it (DMARC) is still in a
testing phase and (people) want to see if it is going
to work for them. Relatively it (DMARC) is still pretty
new for big businesses and such.”
“U5: Domains may fear that they’ve forgotten some-
thing and their email may be rejected due to a mistake
on their part. ”
These concerns also explain why most protocol adopters (as
the sender domain) configure a relaxed SPF/DMARC policy.
Even if sender domain actually specified a strict protocol, the
receiver may not enforce it anyway. U5 expressed that it was
quite often for senders to have mis-configurations. It is easier
to not enforce the strict policy than to ask the senders to fix
their configurations.
“U5: Spam filters are relied upon too heavily and its
sometimes easier to pull email from the spam folder
than ask someone to fix their SPF record and re-send
the email.”
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F. Solutions Moving Forward
We asked the participants to comment on the possible
solutions moving forward. Most of the email administrators
believed that automated detection systems (e.g., anti-spoofing
protocols, spam filters, virus scanners) were necessary, but
could not fully prevent spoofing or phishing. U1, U2, U7, U8
and U9 all have mentioned the importance of user education
to raise the awareness of spoofing, and training users to check
the email authenticity themselves.
“U7: There is no one single way. Technological
defenses like content filtering of incoming mail
(i.e. spam and virus filtering), are necessary but
not sufficient. There is also a need for rigorous
training combined with periodic self-phishing (e.g.
phishme.com), to raise awareness and identify people
who need further training or correction.”
“U8: User education is the most important way to
protect them. I always ask our users to look for
the email that seems suspicious and bring it to
my attention. That way we can prevent malicious
intention at earliest possible.”
Finally, U5 expressed the need to have security indicators on
the email client. The security indicators are icons or visual cues
that are widely used on web browsers to indicate the validity of
SSL certificate of websites. A similar email spoofing indicator
can be deployed to warn users of emails with unverified sender
addresses. In addition, security indicators can also help to high-
light the address misalignment of the Return-Path and Mail
From fields for emails that bypassed the SPF check.
“U5: Add the ability for email clients to warn users
similar to the way browsers do when users are either
presented with a valid extended SSL cert or no SSL
cert at all. May also display the from & reply to
addresses making it harder to get around SPF record
checking.”
V. DISCUSSION
So far, we have explored the challenges for SPF, DKIM
and DMARC to receive a wide adoption. Next, we discuss the
key implications to protocol designers, email providers, and
the end users.
A. Implications for Protocol Designers and Promoters
Improving the Perceived Usefulness. The security and
usability issues in SPF, DKIM and DMARC negatively impact
their perceived usefulness. To improve the perceived usefulness,
addressing these security and usability issues becomes the first
priority. Currently, an IETF group is working on a new protocol
called Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) [18] which is
expected to address email forwarding problem and the mailing
list problem. However, this also adds to the number of protocols
that domain owners need to deploy. New protocols will have
their own challenges to be accepted. For example, the DMARC
protocol, even though incrementally deployable, only achieved
a 4.6% adoption rate in the past two years. A useful protocol
will still face the challenge to be widely adopted.
Building the Critical Mass. Currently, there is a lack of
strong consensus to deploy anti-spoofing protocols. Like many
networking protocols, anti-spoofing protocols will provide key
benefits only after enough domains start to publish their SPF,
DKIM or DMARC records. To bootstrap the adoption and
establish a critical mass, external incentive mechanisms are
needed. In theory, we can adjust the rewarding function to
provide more benefits to early adopters to create a positive net
effect [30]. One possible direction is to learn from the promotion
of “HTTPS” among websites [12]: modern browsers will
display a trusted icon for websites with valid TLS certificates.
Similar security indicators can be added to emails with verified
sender domains (by SPF, DKIM and DMARC), to incentive
domains to publish the corresponding DNS records. In addition,
policymakers or major email providers may also consider
enforcing certain sensitive domains (e.g., banks, government
agencies) to publish their SPF/DKIM/DMARC records to
prevent being impersonated. The challenge is how to realize
these ideas without disrupting any of the normal operations of
the existing email services.
Reducing the Deployment Difficulty. One direction to
improve the adoption rate of anti-spoofing protocols is to make
it easy to deploy and configure. Our user study reveals two
key problems to address. First, more organizations start to
use cloud-based email services (e.g., Google G-Suite, Amazon
WorkMail, Office 365). Anti-spoofing protocols should be more
cloud-friendly for organizations that don’t have full controls
on their mail servers. Second, the deployment process should
be further simplified and providers email administrators with
more controls. The biggest concern from email administrators
is that anti-spoofing protocols may reject legitimate emails or
get their own emails rejected. One direction of improvement is
to allow the protocol to run in a testing mode (e.g., in DMARC),
allowing email administrators to fully assess the impact before
real deployment.
B. Implications for Email Providers
In the short term, email providers are still unlikely to be
able to authenticate all the incoming emails. While email
providers should act as “good Internet citizens” by publishing
their own authentication records, it is also necessary to help
to “educate” their users to watch out for spoofing emails.
Given the current adoption rate of anti-spoofing protocols (and
the relaxed protocol configurations), it is likely that email
providers will still have to deliver certain unverified emails to
the user inbox. Email providers should act more responsibly
by providing the authentication results available for the user
to check, or proactively warn users of emails that they are
not able to verify. Large email providers such as Gmail and
Outlook are already moving towards this direction. Currently,
Gmail’s authentication results are available through the webmail
interface, but unfortunately not yet available on the mobile app
interface. Further research is needed to improve the current
mobile email UI to better support security features.
C. Implications for Users
Given the current situation, users are at the most vulnerable
position. Particularly, considering the usability flaws of the exist-
ing anti-spoofing protocols, an email that passed the SPF/DKIM
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checks can still be a spoofed email (e.g., with misaligned
addresses). Similarly, emails that failed the SPF/DKIM checks
are not necessarily malicious (e.g., forwarded email). To this
end, unless the user is fully aware of the authentication details,
it is safer for general email users to avoid establishing the
trust based on the sender domains. The trustworthiness of the
email should be assessed as a whole. It is more reliable to
leverage the context of the email exchange, and the external
confirmation channels (e.g., calling the sender on the phone) to
identify phishing attempts and securely handle critical emails.
VI. LIMITATIONS
The scale of the user study is still small, which limits us
from producing any statistically significant results. We argue
that our contribution is to provide a “qualitative” understanding
of the problem space, which lays the groundwork for future
quantitative research. For example, one future direction is to
conduct surveys to understand what types of domains are
more likely to adopt anti-spoofing protocols, and how domain
attributes (e.g., service type, popularity, sensitivity) affect the
domain owners’ decision.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine why email spoofing is (still)
possible in today’s email system. We show that extensive efforts
are needed to address the technical issues in the protocol design
and develop external enforcement (or incentives) to bootstrap
the protocol adoption. In addition, improved user interfaces are
needed for email systems to allow users to proactively check
the email authentication results.
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